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The study of simple stochastic games (SSGs) was initiated by Condon for analyzing the
computational power of randomized space-bounded alternating Turing machines. The game
is played by two players, MAX and MIN, on a directed multigraph, and when the play
terminates at a sink vertex s, MAX wins from MIN a payoff p(s) ∈ [0,1]. Condon proved
that the problem SSG-VALUE—given a SSG, determine whether the expected payoff won by
MAX is greater than 1/2 when both players use their optimal strategies—is in NP ∩ coNP.
However, the exact complexity of this problem remains open, as it is not known whether
the problem is in P or is hard for some natural complexity class. In this paper, we study
the computational complexity of a strategy improvement algorithm by Hoffman and Karp
for this problem. The Hoffman–Karp algorithm converges to optimal strategies of a given
SSG, but no non-trivial bounds were previously known on its running time. We prove a
bound of O (2n/n) on the convergence time of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm, and a bound
of O (20.78n) on a randomized variant. These are the ﬁrst non-trivial upper bounds on the
convergence time of these strategy improvement algorithms.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Stochastic games, ﬁrst studied by Shapley in 1953 [18], are two-player graphical games that arise in a number of appli-
cations, including computational complexity theory, game theory, operations research, automated software veriﬁcation, and
reactive systems. Several variations of stochastic games have been studied, and an interesting restriction of this game model
is the class of simple stochastic games (SSGs). Condon [2] initiated the study of SSGs for analyzing the computational power
of randomized space-bounded alternating Turing machines. The game is played by two players, MAX and MIN, on a game
board that is a directed multigraph G = (V , E). The vertex set V of G is partitioned into disjoint subsets VMAX, VMIN, VAVE,
and VSINK. Here, VMAX is the set of vertices controlled by MAX, VMIN is the set of vertices controlled by MIN, and VAVE is
the set of vertices that allow stochastic transitions (edges). The vertices in VSINK, called sink vertices, have zero outdegree,
and each sink vertex x has a rational payoff p(x) ∈ [0,1].
To play a SSG, a token (or pebble) is initially placed on a designated start vertex. At each step of the play, the token is
moved along a directed edge that is determined by the current position (i.e., vertex) of the token and the players’ strategies
(i.e., choices of an outgoing edge from vertices controlled by the players). Suppose that the token is on a vertex x. If x ∈ VMAX
(x ∈ VMIN), then the token is moved onto the end-vertex of the directed edge chosen by MAX (respectively, MIN); if x ∈ VAVE,
then the token is moved onto the end-vertex of a randomly chosen outgoing edge from x. The play stops when the token
✩ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (2010) (Tripathi et al., 2010)
[20].
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264 R. Tripathi et al. / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 9 (2011) 263–278Fig. 1. (a) A non-stopping SSG G with ﬁve game positions and one sink vertex. The game positions are vertex 1 (MAX-position), vertices 2 and 3 (MIN-
positions), and vertices 4 and 5 (AVE-positions). The only sink vertex, 6, has payoff 2/3. The probability associated with each edge leaving some AVE-
position is 1/2. (b) The multigraph Gσ ,τ corresponding to σ = {(1,2)} and MIN-strategy τ = {(2,4), (3,2)}. (c) The multigraph Gσ ,τ corresponding to
σ = {(1,2)} and MIN-strategy τ = {(2,3), (3,2)}.
reaches a sink vertex s; at this point, MAX wins from MIN the payoff p(s) associated with s (see Fig. 1 for an example of
a SSG). The goal of MAX is to maximize the expected payoff won from MIN, while the goal of MIN is to minimize it; see
Section 2 for a formal description. The problem of solving a SSG, called SSG-VALUE, is to determine whether the expected
payoff won by MAX is greater than 1/2 when both players use their optimal strategies.
The problem SSG-VALUE is equivalent to the function problem STABLE-CIRCUIT [11] in which the input consists of a
circuit C rather than a two-player graphical game. The input circuit C is made of gates MAX, MIN, and AVG such that
each gate has fan-in two and the output of a gate is allowed to be an input of a previous gate (i.e., internal feedbacks are
allowed). The circuit C takes only two inputs, 0-input and 1-input, whose values are hard-wired to 0 and 1, respectively.
Here, the gates of C are implicitly assumed to be ordered from 1 to |C |, where |C | denotes the total number of gates in C .
The output of the gate MAX is deﬁned by MAX(x, y) = max{x, y}, of the gate MIN is deﬁned by MIN(x, y) = min{x, y}, and
of the gate AVG is deﬁned by AVG(x, y) = (x+ y)/2. Such a circuit is referred to as a MIN/MAX/AVG circuit.
A circuit value of a MIN/MAX/AVG circuit C is a vector v ∈ [0,1]|C | of |C | values, where the i’th component vi ∈ [0,1]
is an assignment for the i’th gate of C . For convenience, assume that any circuit value v assigns the 0-input to 0 and the
1-input to 1. Given such a circuit C , a circuit-wide update function FC : [0,1]|C | → [0,1]|C | is deﬁned that takes a circuit
value v and transforms it to another circuit value FC (v) = w as follows: For every 1 i  |C |, the component wi of w is
the maximum, minimum, or the average of the values assigned by v to the inputs of i’th gate of C when this gate is a MAX,
MIN, or AVG, respectively. A circuit value v is said to be a stable solution if FC (v) = v , i.e., if v is a ﬁxed point of FC . It is
known that there always exists a stable solution of any MIN/MAX/AVG circuit C [11] and that there is a unique minimum
stable solution m of C that is minimum in the sense that, for any other stable solution v of C and for any index 1 i  |C |,
it holds that mi  vi . The function problem STABLE-CIRCUIT asks: given a MIN/MAX/AVG circuit C , ﬁnd the minimum stable
solution of C . The problems SSG-VALUE and STABLE-CIRCUIT are known to be polynomial-time Turing equivalent. Refer to
[16,11] for more discussion on STABLE-CIRCUIT.
Condon [2] proved that SSG-VALUE is complete for the class of languages accepted by logspace randomized alternating
Turing machines and that it belongs to the class NP ∩ coNP. Despite considerable interest, the complexity of SSG-VALUE
is not fully resolved as it is unknown whether the problem is in P or is hard for some natural complexity class. The best
known algorithms for SSG-VALUE are sub-exponential-time randomized algorithms of Ludwig [13] and Halman [8]. This puts
SSG-VALUE among a small list of natural combinatorial problems in NP ∩ coNP that are not yet known to be in P; the sub-
exponential upper bound makes this problem rarer still. Moreover, some other game problems, such as Parity Games (PGs),
Mean Payoff Games (MPGs), and Discounted Payoff Games (DPGs), polynomial-time reduce to SSG-VALUE [17,7,22], and thus
a polynomial-time algorithm for SSG-VALUE would imply a polynomial-time algorithm for all these games problems. PGs
play an important role in veriﬁcation and automata theory, while MPGs are useful in the design and analysis of algorithms
for problems related to online job scheduling, ﬁnite-window online string matching, and selection with limited storage [22].
Apart from the results in [13,8], very few additional upper bound results are known for SSG-VALUE. Condon [2] showed
that restricted versions of SSG-VALUE consisting of only two classes of vertices (out of VMAX, VMIN and VAVE) can be solved
in polynomial time. This was extended by Gimbert et al. [6] who developed a ﬁxed parameter tractable algorithm in terms
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other algorithms for this problem based on the general approach of strategy improvement, which involves switching the
choices of vertices that are not locally optimal. One well-studied strategy improvement algorithm is the Hoffman–Karp
algorithm [9] (described in Section 3) in which choices of all locally non-optimal vertices are switched in each iteration
until optimal strategies are found. Condon [2] showed that the Hoffman–Karp algorithm does converge to the optimum,
though its convergence time is still not very well understood. The speciﬁc details of such strategy improvement algorithms
are important, and as discussed by Condon [3], variants of Hoffman–Karp and other seemingly natural heuristics do not
converge to the optimum.
The focus of this paper is on understanding the convergence time of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm. Let n denote
min{|VMAX|, |VMIN|}. We show that the convergence time of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm is O (2n/n). This is the ﬁrst non-
trivial upper bound on the convergence time of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm. We also consider a randomized variant of
this algorithm, and show that the convergence time of the randomized algorithm is O (20.78n). While these bounds are
still exponential, they represent an improved understanding of these strategy improvement algorithms. Our analyses extend
those of Mansour and Singh [15] for policy iteration algorithms for Markov decision processes, which are special classes of
stochastic games with a single player.
2. Preliminaries
We now discuss the basic concepts and notations needed for the rest of the paper. We follow the deﬁnitions presented
in [19] for the most part.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Simple stochastic games). A SSG is a two-player game between players MAX and MIN. The game is played on a
game board that is a directed multigraph G = (V , E). The vertex set V is partitioned into disjoint subsets VMAX, VMIN, VAVE,
and VSINK. All vertices of G , except those of VSINK, have exactly two outgoing edges. The vertices belonging to VSINK have
no outgoing edge. The vertex set VPOS =df VMAX ∪ VMIN ∪ VAVE represents the set of all game positions and the edge set E
denotes a possible move in the game. One vertex from VPOS is called start vertex. We call x ∈ V a MAX-position if x ∈ VMAX,
a MIN-position if x ∈ VMIN, an AVE-position if x ∈ VAVE, and a sink if x ∈ VSINK. Each sink x has a rational payoff p(x) ∈ [0,1].
For every x ∈ VAVE, every edge leaving x is labeled with a rational probability such that the sum of probabilities over all
edges leaving x is one; the probability associated with an edge (x, y) ∈ E , for x ∈ VAVE, is denoted by q(x, y). The outgoing
edges from any vertex x ∈ VMAX ∪ VMIN are unlabeled.
In what follows, we refer to a SSG by the name of its game board, i.e., the multigraph G . Thus, saying that G is a SSG
means that the SSG is deﬁned on a game board G that is a directed multigraph. We denote the game G starting at vertex x
by G(x).
Deﬁnition 2.1 generalizes the usual deﬁnition of SSGs in the papers [2,3,13,8] in that the former deﬁnition allows sink
vertices to have rational payoffs whereas the latter considers only two types of sink vertices, 0-sink and 1-sink, but no
payoffs. The 0-sink and the 1-sink vertices in the usual deﬁnition correspond to the sink vertex with payoff 0 and the
sink vertex with payoff 1, respectively, in our deﬁnition. However, as discussed by Condon [2], the problem SSG-VALUE
corresponding to these two deﬁnitions of SSGs are polynomial-time equivalent.
A strategy of a player speciﬁes the choices made by the player during a play of the game. A strategy is pure if the choices
are made in a deterministic manner, and is mixed if the choices are made according to some probability distribution. A pure
strategy may depend on time, and, more generally, it may depend on the history of a play. On the other hand, a stationary
(or memoryless) strategy depends only on the current state of a play, and is independent of both time and history. Condon
[2] showed that both MAX and MIN have optimal strategies (Deﬁnition 2.7) that are pure and stationary. Therefore, in this
paper, we consider only pure, stationary strategies of the two players.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Strategies). A strategy σ of MAX is a function σ : VMAX → V such that, for every x ∈ VMAX, we have
(x, σ (x)) ∈ E . Similarly, a strategy τ of MIN is a function τ : VMIN → V such that, for every x ∈ VMIN, we have (x, τ (x)) ∈ E .
We sometimes represent any MAX-strategy σ by the set {(x, y) | x ∈ VMAX and y = σ(x)} and represent any MIN-strategy
τ by the set {(x, y) | x ∈ VMIN and y = τ (x)}. The rules of playing a SSG according to a MAX-strategy σ and a MIN-strategy
τ are formally described in Deﬁnition 2.3.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (A play of a SSG). Let G be a SSG, σ be a MAX-strategy, τ be a MIN-strategy, and x ∈ VPOS be a game position.
Before we begin playing G(x), a token is placed on x. At each step of the play, the token is moved from current vertex y ∈ V
to a neighboring vertex according to the following rules:
• If y ∈ VMAX, then MAX takes a turn and moves the token from y to σ(y).
• If y ∈ VMIN, then MIN takes a turn and moves the token from y to τ (y).
• If y ∈ VAVE, then none of the players take any turn. Instead, the token is moved from y to a neighboring vertex chosen
randomly from a distribution q(y, ·) over the neighbors of y.
266 R. Tripathi et al. / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 9 (2011) 263–278If the current vertex y ∈ VSINK, then the play stops. At this point, MAX wins a payoff p(y) ∈ [0,1] from MIN (equivalently,
MIN looses p(y) to MAX). A play of G(x) is, therefore, deﬁned to be a maximal path starting from x that the token takes.
For any strategy α of a player P ∈ {MAX,MIN}, we say that a play x0, x1, x2, . . . of G(x0) conﬁrms to α if, for every
xi ∈ V P , we have xi+1 = α(xi).
Because the move from any AVE-position is probabilistic, the payoff won by MAX is a random variable in the range [0,1].
The objective of MAX is to choose a strategy σ that maximizes the expected payoff, while the objective of MIN is to choose
a strategy τ that minimizes the expected payoff.
For every choice of start vertex x and strategies σ and τ of the players MAX and MIN, respectively, the expected payoff
vσ ,τ (x) that MAX wins is deﬁned as the weighted sum of payoffs p(s) over all sink vertices s, where the weight contributed
by a sink vertex s is the probability that a play of G(x) conﬁrming to σ and τ stops at s. For any strategies σ , τ of the
players, the expected payoff vector vσ ,τ contains vσ ,τ (x) for every x ∈ VPOS.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Expected payoffs). Let σ and τ be strategies of the players MAX and MIN, respectively. Let qσ ,τ (x, s) denote
the probability that a play of G(x) conﬁrming to σ and τ stops at a sink vertex s. The expected payoff vector vσ ,τ : VPOS →
[0,1] of G corresponding to σ and τ is deﬁned as follows: For every x ∈ VPOS,
vσ ,τ (x) =
∑
s∈VSINK
qσ ,τ (x, s) · p(s).
It is implicit in the above deﬁnition that vσ ,τ (x) = 0 if no play of G(x) conﬁrming to σ and τ is ﬁnite. A stopping SSG
G is a SSG in which starting at any initial position x, any play of G(x) stops at a sink vertex with probability one regardless
of the strategies used by the players. Stopping SSGs are known to have certain desirable properties (e.g., the existence of
a unique optimal value vector). Condon [2] showed that there is a polynomial-time transformation that, given any SSG G ,
constructs a new stopping SSG G ′ such that G ′ is as good as G for studying the problem SSG-VALUE. (See Lemma 2.24
for a precise statement relating the two SSGs.) Since the focus of this paper is on studying algorithms for the problem
SSG-VALUE, we will henceforth restrict our attention to only stopping SSGs.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Stopping SSGs). A SSG G is said to be a stopping SSG if, for every MAX-strategy σ and MIN-strategy τ and for
any position x, there is a play of G(x) conﬁrming to σ and τ that stops at a sink vertex (in other words, with probability
one, any play of G(x) conﬁrming to σ and τ is ﬁnite).
Corresponding to any MAX-strategy σ and MIN-strategy τ in a SSG G , there is a multigraph Gσ ,τ deﬁned as follows:
Gσ ,τ is obtained from G by removing from each MAX-position x the outgoing edge (x, z) for which z 	= σ(x) and by
removing from each MIN-position y the outgoing edge (y,w) for which w 	= τ (y). Thus, Gσ ,τ has exactly one outgoing
edge from each MAX-position and each MIN-position. For every position x in G and Gσ ,τ , any play of G(x) conﬁrming to
σ and τ can be considered as an equivalent play in Gσ ,τ starting at x. The only distinct point is that whenever the token
is at y ∈ VMAX ∪ VMIN, the next move in G is determined by a player strategy whereas the next move in Gσ ,τ is onto the
end-vertex of the unique outgoing edge from y.
Fig. 1(a) shows an example of a SSG G . Fig. 1(b) shows the multigraph Gσ ,τ corresponding to the MAX-strategy σ =
{(1,2)} and MIN-strategy τ = {(2,4), (3,2)}. For this choice of player strategies, any play of G(1) stops at the sink vertex 6
with probability one and the expected payoff vector vσ ,τ is (2/3,2/3,2/3,2/3,2/3). Fig. 1(c) shows the multigraph Gσ ,τ
corresponding to the MAX-strategy σ = {(1,2)} and MIN-strategy τ = {(2,3), (3,2)}. For this choice of player strategies,
no play of G(1) is ﬁnite and the expected payoff vector vσ ,τ is (0,0,0,2/3,1/3). Therefore, the SSG in Fig. 1(a) is a non-
stopping SSG. An example of a stopping SSG is shown in Fig. 2.
Given any strategy τ of MIN, a best response (i.e., optimal) strategy σ = σ(τ ) of MAX w.r.t. τ , if it exists, is one that,
for every game position x ∈ VPOS, assures the maximum payoff for MAX over all choices of MAX-strategies, i.e., vσ ,τ (x) =
maxσ ′ vσ ′,τ (x). Similarly, given any strategy σ of MAX, a best response strategy τ = τ (σ ) of MIN w.r.t. σ , if it exists, is
one that, for every game position x ∈ VPOS, assures the minimum payoff for MAX over all choices of MIN-strategies, i.e.,
vσ ,τ (x) = minτ ′ vσ ,τ ′ (x). Howard [10] showed that such strategies always exist for a stopping SSG, and therefore, σ(τ ) and
τ (σ ) are well deﬁned in this case. Derman’s [4] LP formulation can be used for constructing these best response strategies
for any stopping SSG in polynomial time.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Best response strategies). A strategy σ of MAX is said to be optimal with respect to a strategy τ of MIN if, for
every x ∈ VPOS,
vσ ,τ (x) = max
σ ′
vσ ′,τ (x).
Similarly, a strategy τ of MIN is said to be optimal with respect to a strategy σ of MAX if, for every x ∈ VPOS,
vσ ,τ (x) = min
τ ′
vσ ,τ ′(x).
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stopping SSG has optimal strategies.
Deﬁnition 2.7 (Optimal strategies). Let σ and τ be strategies of MAX and MIN, respectively. Strategies σ and τ are optimal at
x ∈ VPOS if, for any strategy σ ′ of MAX and for any strategy τ ′ of MIN, it holds that vσ ′,τ (x) vσ ,τ (x) vσ ,τ ′ (x). Strategies
σ and τ are optimal if they are optimal at every x ∈ VPOS.
The expected payoff vector corresponding to a pair of optimal strategies is called an optimal value vector. Condon [2]
showed that every stopping SSG has an optimal value vector, which is unique.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Optimal value vector). For any pair of optimal strategies σ ,τ at x ∈ VPOS, the expected payoff vopt(x) =df
vσ ,τ (x) is called an optimal value of G(x). If, for every x ∈ VPOS, there exist optimal strategies at x, then a vector vopt :
VPOS → [0,1] of optimal values is called an optimal value vector of G .
We call any mapping v : VPOS → [0,1] a value vector. Sometimes, we extend the domain of such a value vector v to VSINK
and deﬁne the mapping of any sink vertex s as the payoff p(s) ∈ [0,1]. We use v to denote this extension of v . For any
MAX-strategy σ and MIN-strategy τ , this extension of a value vector vσ ,τ is denoted by vσ ,τ .
Given a value vector v , we deﬁne v-stable and v-switchable positions in Deﬁnitions 2.9 and 2.10, respectively. Notice that
only a position x ∈ VMAX ∪ VMIN can possibly be a v-switchable position and that no position can both be v-switchable and
v-stable.
Deﬁnition 2.9 (Stable positions). Let v : VPOS → [0,1] be a value vector. For any x ∈ VPOS, we say that x is v-stable
if either x ∈ VMAX and v(x) = max{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E}, or x ∈ VMIN and v(x) = min{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E}, or x ∈ VAVE and
v(x) =∑(x,y)∈E q(x, y) · v(y).
The v-switchable positions, deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.10, will be useful in constructing an improved value vector from v
(see Lemma 3.5).
Deﬁnition 2.10 (Switchable positions). Let v : VPOS → [0,1] be a value vector. For any x ∈ VMAX ∪ VMIN, we say that x is
v-switchable if either x ∈ VMAX and v(x) <max{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E}, or x ∈ VMIN and v(x) >min{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E}.
Given a value vector v , we say that a player strategy is v-greedy if the strategy makes locally optimal choice w.r.t. v at
every position of the player.
Deﬁnition 2.11 (Greedy strategies). Let v : VPOS → [0,1] be a value vector. A MAX-strategy σ is said to be v-greedy at
x ∈ VMAX if v(σ (x)) = max{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E}. Similarly, a MIN-strategy τ is said to be v-greedy at x ∈ VMIN if v(τ (x)) =
min{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E}. For P ∈ {MAX,MIN}, a strategy of P is said to be v-greedy if it is v-greedy at each x ∈ V P .
Condon [2] introduced an operator FG corresponding to any SSG G . This operator allows to give an alternate characteri-
zation of an optimal value vector of G (see Lemmas 2.18 and 2.19).
Deﬁnition 2.12. ([2]) Let σ and τ be strategies of MAX and MIN, respectively. An operator FG : (VPOS → [0,1]) → (VPOS →
[0,1]) is deﬁned as follows: For every v : VPOS → [0,1], we have FG(v) = w such that, for every x ∈ VPOS,
w(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
max{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E} if x ∈ VMAX,
min{v(y) | (x, y) ∈ E} if x ∈ VMIN,∑
(x,y)∈E q(x, y) · v(y) if x ∈ VAVE.
Given any MAX-strategy σ and MIN-strategy τ , we can associate an operator Fσ ,τ deﬁned below. This operator allows
to give an alternate characterization of the expected payoff vector vσ ,τ (see Corollary 2.15).
Deﬁnition 2.13. ([19]) Let σ and τ be strategies of MAX and MIN, respectively. Corresponding to σ and τ , we deﬁne an
operator Fσ ,τ : (VPOS → [0,1]) → (VPOS → [0,1]) as follows: For every v : VPOS → [0,1], we have Fσ ,τ (v) = w such that,
for every x ∈ VPOS,
w(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
v(σ (x)) if x ∈ VMAX,
v(τ (x)) if x ∈ VMIN,∑
(x,y)∈E q(x, y) · v(y) if x ∈ VAVE.
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is the unique solution to a system of linear equations, and so it can be computed in polynomial time.
Lemma2.14. ([2]) Let G be a stopping SSG, and let σ and τ be strategies ofMAX andMIN, respectively. Then there are a |VPOS|×|VPOS|
matrix Qσ ,τ with entries in A =df {0,1} ∪ {q(x, y) | x ∈ VAVE and (x, y) ∈ E} and a |VPOS|-vector bσ ,τ with entries in {a · p(x) | a ∈
A and x ∈ VSINK} such that vσ ,τ is the unique solution to the matrix equation vσ ,τ = Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ . Also, I − Qσ ,τ is invertible,
all entries of (I − Qσ ,τ )−1 are non-negative, and the entries along the diagonal are strictly positive.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 2.14, we get Corollary 2.15. Note that a ﬁxed point of an operator F is an element of
the domain of F such that F (x) = x. The fact that vσ ,τ is a ﬁxed point of Fσ ,τ also appears in [19, Proposition 2.4].
Corollary 2.15. Let G be a stopping SSG and let σ and τ be strategies of MAX and MIN, respectively. The expected payoff vector vσ ,τ
is the unique ﬁxed point of the operator Fσ ,τ . Moreover, vσ ,τ can be computed in polynomial time by solving a system of |VPOS|
linear equations.
Proof. Lemma 2.14 implies that vσ ,τ is the unique solution to the equation vσ ,τ = Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ . Notice that, by Deﬁni-
tion 2.13, for any value vector v , Fσ ,τ satisﬁes Fσ ,τ (v) = Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ . Thus, it follows that vσ ,τ is the unique solution
to the equation Fσ ,τ (v) = v , and so is the unique ﬁxed point of Fσ ,τ . Next, computing vσ ,τ requires solving the linear
system vσ ,τ = Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ that takes polynomial time. 
2.1. Existence of best response strategies
Lemma 2.16 gives an alternate characterization of best response strategies. Its proof is similar to the proof of correctness
of Howard’s algorithm [10] presented in [2, Lemma 4].
Lemma 2.16. Let G be a stopping SSG, and let σ , τ be strategies of MAX and MIN, respectively, in G. Then the following statements
hold:
1. σ is optimal w.r.t. τ if and only if, for every x ∈ VMAX , we have vσ ,τ (x) = max{vσ ,τ (y) | (x, y) ∈ E}.
2. τ is optimal w.r.t. σ if and only if, for every x ∈ VMIN , we have vσ ,τ (x) = min{vσ ,τ (y) | (x, y) ∈ E}.
Lemma 2.17 shows that, for stopping SSGs with only MIN- and AVE-positions, an optimal strategy of MIN can be found
in polynomial time.
Lemma 2.17. ([4]) Let G be a stopping SSG with no MAX-positions. Then an optimal strategy of MIN (w.r.t. this trivial MAX-strategy
σ ) can be found in polynomial time by solving the following linear program:
Maximize
∑
x∈V
v(x)
subject to v(x) v(y) if x ∈ VMIN and (x, y) ∈ E,
v(x) =
∑
(x,y)∈E
q(x, y) · v(y) if x ∈ VAVE,
v(x) = p(x) if x ∈ VSINK.
Let v : V → [0,1] be an optimal solution of this linear program and let v : VPOS → [0,1] be such that v(x) = v(x), for every x ∈ VPOS .
Then, any v-greedy strategy of MIN is also his optimal strategy.
Since the size of the linear program (LP) in Lemma 2.17 is polynomial in |V |, this LP can be solved in time polynomial
in |V | using any polynomial-time LP solver. In a similar way, for any stopping SSG that has no MIN-positions, it is possible
to design a minimizing linear program for computing an optimal strategy of MAX in polynomial time. Extending the proof
technique used in Lemma 2.17, it can be shown that, for any stopping SSG and for any MAX-strategy σ , an optimal MIN-
strategy τ (σ ) w.r.t. σ can be found in polynomial time. Similarly, for any stopping SSG and for any MIN-strategy τ , we can
ﬁnd an optimal MAX-strategy σ(τ ) w.r.t. τ in polynomial time.
Henceforward, τ (σ ) refers to such an optimal MIN-strategy w.r.t. any MAX-strategy σ , and σ(τ ) refers to such an
optimal MAX-strategy w.r.t. any MIN-strategy τ . For every MAX-strategy σ , we write Sσ to denote the set of all vσ ,τ (σ )-
switchable positions, and, for every MIN-strategy τ , we write Tτ to denote the set of all vσ(τ ),τ -switchable positions of G .
Note that Sσ ⊆ VMAX and Tτ ⊆ VMIN.
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Lemma 2.18 shows that, for any stopping SSG, there is a unique solution to the local optimality equations given by the
operator FG of Deﬁnition 2.12; this solution is also an optimal value vector of G . This lemma implies that there always exist
optimal strategies and an optimal value vector of a stopping SSG. We refer to [19, Theorem 2.7] for a proof sketch of this
lemma.
Lemma 2.18. ([2,18]) Let G be a stopping SSG. Then there is a unique ﬁxed point v : VPOS → [0,1] of the operator FG . Moreover,
v is an optimal value vector of G, and v-greedy strategies σ and τ are optimal strategies of G.
Lemma 2.19 states that any optimal value vector of a stopping SSG is a ﬁxed point of the operator FG . The proof of this
lemma is similar to the proofs in [2, Lemmas 4 and 5].
Lemma 2.19. (See [2].) Let G be a stopping SSG and let vopt be an optimal value vector of G. Then vopt is a ﬁxed point of the operator
FG .
Lemma 2.19 implies that there is a unique optimal value vector of a stopping SSG, since FG has a unique ﬁxed point by
Lemma 2.18. Therefore, any pair of optimal strategies of a stopping SSG yields the same optimal value vector of the SSG.
Henceforth, we refer to an optimal value vector of a stopping SSG as the optimal value vector of the game.
The proof of the following lemma can be found in [2, Lemma 6] and [19, Proposition 2.8].
Lemma 2.20. (See [2,19].) Let G be a stopping SSG and let vopt be the optimal value vector of G. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
1. strategies σ and τ are optimal,
2. vσ ,τ (x) = maxσ minτ vσ ,τ (x) = minτ maxσ vσ ,τ (x) for every x ∈ V ,
3. vσ ,τ = vopt ,
4. strategies σ and τ are vσ ,τ -greedy for MAX and MIN, respectively,
5. strategies σ and τ are vopt-greedy for MAX and MIN, respectively.
As pointed out in [19], the following observations can be made from Lemma 2.20.
Observation 2.21. For any stopping SSG, knowing the optimal value vector vopt yields (in polynomial time) a pair of optimal
strategies σ and τ , as σ and τ are vopt-greedy by the equivalence of parts (1) and (5) in Lemma 2.20.
Observation 2.22. For any stopping SSG, a polynomial-time test for the optimality of strategies σ and τ can be done in two
steps: First compute vσ ,τ given σ and τ , and then verify whether σ and τ are vσ ,τ -greedy for MAX and MIN, respectively.
Computing vσ ,τ in the ﬁrst step takes polynomial time by Corollary 2.15. The correctness of the second step follows from
the equivalence of parts (1) and (4) in Lemma 2.20.
2.3. The SSG value problem
Deﬁnition 2.23. ([2]) The value of a SSG and the problem SSG-VALUE are deﬁned as follows:
1. The value of a SSG G is maxσ minτ vσ ,τ (start vertex).
2. The problem SSG-VALUE is: Given a SSG G , is the value of G > 12 ?
The next lemma explains why it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to stopping SSGs for studying the problem SSG-VALUE.
Lemma 2.24. ([2]) Given any SSG G, we can transform G to a stopping SSG G ′ in time polynomial in the size of G such that G ′ has
the same number of MAX and MIN positions as G and the value of G ′ is greater than 1/2 if and only if the value of G is greater than
1/2.
The notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
3. Results
The strategy improvement method is an iterative procedure for constructing optimal strategies within a ﬁnite number of
iterations in a decision-making scenario (e.g., game). This technique was developed ﬁrst in the context of Markov decision
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Notations used in this paper.
Notation Meaning
G a simple stochastic game
MAX player MAX
MIN player MIN
VMAX the set of all MAX-positions
VMIN the set of all MIN-positions
VAVE the set of all AVE-positions
VSINK the set of all sink vertices
VPOS the set of all game positions of G; equals to VMAX ∪ VMIN ∪ VAVE
V the vertex set of G; equals to VPOS ∪ VSINK
E the edge set of G
Start vertex the start position of G
q(x, y) the probability that the next move from an AVE-position x is to y
p(x) the payoff associated with a sink vertex x
σ a strategy of MAX
τ a strategy of MIN
vσ ,τ the expected payoff vector corresponding to strategies σ and τ
vopt an optimal value vector of a SSG
v the extension of a value vector v to VSINK
vσ ,τ the extension of the expected payoff vector vσ ,τ to VSINK
Fσ ,τ an operator with respect to strategies σ and τ
FG an operator with respect to a SSG G
σ(τ ) an optimal strategy of MAX w.r.t. a MIN-strategy τ
τ (σ ) an optimal strategy of MIN w.r.t. a MAX-strategy σ
Sσ the set of all vσ ,τ (σ )-switchable MAX-positions
Tτ the set of all vσ (τ ),τ -switchable MIN-positions
0 any vector in which each component is zero
Input : A stopping SSG G
Output: optimal strategies σ ,τ and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Let σ and τ be arbitrary strategies of MAX and MIN, respectively2
while (FG (vσ ,τ ) 	= vσ ,τ ) do3
Let S ← the set of all vσ ,τ -switchable MAX-positions4
Let σ ′ ← switch(σ , S)5
Let τ ′ be an optimal strategy of MIN w.r.t. σ ′6
Let σ ← σ ′ , τ ← τ ′7
end8
Output σ ,τ and the optimal value vector vσ ,τ9
end10
Algorithm 1: The Hoffman–Karp algorithm [9].
processes, which are SSGs that have only MAX- and AVE-positions, but no MIN-positions. In Section 3.2, we study a strategy
improvement algorithm by Hoffman and Karp [9] (Algorithm 1) for SSG-VALUE.
The Hoffman–Karp algorithm (Algorithm 1) starts with an initial pair of player strategies. It then iteratively com-
putes new player strategies until a pair of optimal strategies is found. W.l.o.g. assume that |VMAX|  |VMIN| and let
n = min{|VMAX|, |VMIN|}. In each iteration, the current strategy σ of MAX is changed to σ ′ by switching the choices of
all MAX-positions at which local optimality is not achieved, while the MIN-strategy is always the best response strategy
τ (σ ′) w.r.t. the new MAX-strategy σ ′ . The algorithm terminates when all MAX-positions (and also MIN-positions) are lo-
cally optimal. At this point, the value vector vσ ,τ (σ ) corresponding to the current MAX-strategy σ and MIN-strategy τ (σ )
will satisfy the local optimality equations given by the operator FG (Deﬁnition 2.12), and so it will be a ﬁxed point of FG .
W.l.o.g. we may assume that Algorithm 1 begins with a strategy pair σ , τ such that τ is an optimal strategy of MIN
w.r.t. σ . This assumption does not change the asymptotic run-time complexity of Algorithm 1 as the strategy pair σ , τ at
the end of the ﬁrst iteration of the while loop in fact constitutes such a pair. We will make this assumption in the analysis
of Algorithm 1 presented in Section 3.2.
Each iteration of the while loop in Algorithm 1 requires (a) computing vσ ,τ given player strategies σ and τ , and (b)
computing an optimal MIN-strategy τ ′ w.r.t. a MAX-strategy σ ′ . By Corollary 2.15, vσ ,τ can be computed in polynomial
time, and as discussed after Lemma 2.17, so τ ′ can be as τ ′ = τ (σ ′). It follows that every iteration of the while loop can
be executed in polynomial time. Thus, it only remains to prove the correctness of the algorithm and bound the number of
iterations of the while loop.
The proof of correctness is based on a property of value vectors that is formally stated in Lemma 3.5. Using this property,
it can be shown that in every iteration, the new value vector vσ ′,τ ′ improves upon the original vector vσ ,τ in the following
sense: For all positions x, vσ ,τ (x)  vσ ′,τ ′ (x), and for all MAX-switchable positions y, this inequality is strict. Thus, it
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MAX-strategies in a (binary) SSG with n MAX-positions, this algorithm requires at most 2n iterations of the while loop in
the worst case.
It is important to study the convergence time (i.e., the number of iterations) of strategy improvement algorithms for
solving SSGs (e.g., the Hoffman–Karp algorithm and its many variants). These algorithms are not complicated from im-
plementation perspective, and so a non-trivial upper bound on their convergence time might have a practical value.
Melekopoglou and Condon [14] showed that many variations of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm require Ω(2n) iterations in
the worst case. In these variations, only one MAX-switchable position is switched at every iteration as opposed to all MAX-
switchable positions in the Hoffman–Karp algorithm. In a recent breakthrough, Friedmann [5] presented a super-polynomial
lower bound for the discrete strategy improvement algorithm of Vöge and Jurdzin´ski [21] for solving parity games. The
paper [1] reports that Friedmann’s lower bound can be extended to the Hoffman–Karp algorithm for solving SSGs.
In Section 3.2, we prove that the Hoffman–Karp algorithm requires O (2n/n) iterations in the worst case. This is the ﬁrst
non-trivial upper bound on the worst-case convergence time of this algorithm. In Section 3.3, we propose a randomized
variant of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm and prove that with probability almost one this randomized strategy improvement
algorithm requires O (20.78n) iterations in the worst case. Our analyses in these sections extend those of Mansour and Singh
[15] for policy improvement algorithms for Markov decision processes.
We now present some deﬁnitions that will be used in these sections. Deﬁnition 3.1 shows how a new MAX-strategy
switch(σ , S) is constructed from a MAX-strategy σ by switching the choices at any set S ⊆ VMAX.
Deﬁnition 3.1. For every MAX-strategy σ and S ⊆ VMAX, let switch(σ , S) : VMAX → V be a MAX-strategy obtained from σ
by switching the choices of the positions of S only. That is, for every x ∈ VMAX such that (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E and y = σ(x), we
have
switch(σ , S)(x) =
{
y if x /∈ S, and
z if x ∈ S.
The following deﬁnition associates partial orders (≺ and ) on the set of value vectors.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let u, v ∈ [0,1]N , for some N ∈ N+ . We say that
• u  v if for each x ∈ [N], it holds that u(x) v(x).
• u ≺ v if u  v and there is an x ∈ [N] such that u(x) < v(x).
• u and v are incomparable if there are x, y ∈ [N] such that u(x) < v(x) and v(y) < u(y).
• u  v if either v ≺ u, or u and v are incomparable.
• u ⊀ v if either v  u, or u and v are incomparable.
We will need Fact 3.3 in the proofs of Theorems 3.12 and 3.17 for bounding the number of iterations of some strategy
improvement algorithms for solving SSGs.
Fact 3.3. (See [12].) Let H(x) =df −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) for 0< x< 1 and H(0) = H(1) = 0. Then, for every integer 0 s
t/2, we have
∑s
k=0
(t
k
)
 2t·H(s/t) .
3.1. Some properties of value vectors
We establish some properties of value vectors that are crucial in the analyses presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The ﬁrst
property says that optimal strategies are simultaneously best for each player assuming that the other player always plays
optimally.
Lemma 3.4. Let σ ,τ be a pair of optimal strategies of a stopping SSG. Then, for anyMAX-strategy σ ′ , it holds that vσ ′,τ (σ ′)  vσ ,τ .
Similarly, for any MIN-strategy τ ′ , it holds that vσ ,τ  vσ(τ ′),τ ′ .
Proof. Since τ (σ ′) is optimal w.r.t. σ ′ , we know from Deﬁnition 2.6 that
∀x ∈ VPOS, vσ ′,τ (σ ′)(x) = min
τ
vσ ′,τ (x).
Thus, it holds that
∀x ∈ VPOS, vσ ′,τ (σ ′)(x)max
σ
min
τ
vσ ,τ (x). (1)
Since σ , τ are optimal strategies of G , we know from Lemma 2.20 that
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σ
min
τ
vσ ,τ (x). (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we get that
∀x ∈ VPOS, vσ ′,τ (σ ′)(x) vσ ,τ (x).
This completes the proof that vσ ′,τ (σ ′)  vσ ,τ .
The proof of the second part, namely, vσ ,τ  vσ(τ ′),τ ′ , is similar. So, we omit this proof. 
Lemma 3.5 is a generalization of [13, Lemma 6]. Its proof is based on proofs by Howard [10] and Condon [2]. The lemma
says that switching the choices of any nonempty subset of vσ ,τ (σ )-switchable MAX-positions results in an improved value
vector.
Lemma 3.5. For any stopping SSG G, let σ be any strategy ofMAX such that Sσ is nonempty. Let S be any nonempty subset of Sσ . Let
σ ′ =df switch(σ , S) be a MAX-strategy in G. Then, it holds that vσ ,τ (σ ) ≺ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) .
Proof. Recall that τ (σ ) (τ (σ ′)) denotes an optimal MIN-strategy w.r.t. σ (respectively, σ ′). For brevity, we write τ for τ (σ )
and τ ′ for τ (σ ′).
Since G is a stopping SSG, we know from Lemma 2.14 that vσ ,τ and vσ ′,τ ′ are the unique solutions to the matrix
equations
vσ ,τ = Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ , (3)
vσ ′,τ ′ = Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ′,τ ′ + bσ ′,τ ′ , (4)
for some |VPOS| × |VPOS| matrices Qσ ,τ and Qσ ′,τ ′ , and |VPOS|-vectors bσ ,τ and bσ ′,τ ′ . Let ϑ = vσ ′,τ ′ − vσ ,τ . We show that
0 ϑ and that some entry of ϑ is positive. By Deﬁnition 3.2, this would imply that vσ ,τ ≺ vσ ′,τ ′ .
Subtracting Eq. (3) from Eq. (4), we get
ϑ = (Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ′,τ ′ + bσ ′,τ ′) − (Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ ).
Adding and subtracting (Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ′) to the r.h.s. of the above equation, we get
ϑ = (Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ′,τ ′ + bσ ′,τ ′) − (Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ′) + (Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ′) − (Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ ), or
ϑ = Qσ ′,τ ′ϑ + d,
where d = (Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ′ ) − (Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ ). From Lemma 2.14, we know that I − Qσ ′,τ ′ is invertible since G is
a stopping SSG. Therefore, there is a unique solution to ϑ given by ϑ = (I − Qσ ′,τ ′)−1d. Lemma 2.14 also implies that
(I − Qσ ′,τ ′ )−1 has all entries non-negative and only positive entries along the diagonal. So, it suﬃces to show that 0  d
and that some entry of d is positive.
Notice that the vector Qσ ′,τ ′ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ′ equals to Fσ ′,τ ′ (vσ ,τ ) and the vector Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ equals to Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ ),
where the operators Fσ ′,τ ′ and Fσ ,τ are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.13. Thus, it follows that
d = Fσ ′,τ ′(vσ ,τ ) − Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ ). (5)
Consider any x ∈ S . In this case, Fσ ′,τ ′ (vσ ,τ )(x) = vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)) and Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ )(x) = vσ ,τ (σ (x)). Thus, by Eq. (5),
d(x) = vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)) − vσ ,τ (σ (x)). Since x ∈ S and S ⊆ Sσ , x is a vσ ,τ -switchable MAX-position. Therefore, by Deﬁni-
tion 2.10, we must have vσ ,τ (x) < max{vσ ,τ (y) | (x, y) ∈ E} = vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)). Since vσ ,τ (x) = vσ ,τ (σ (x)), we get that
vσ ,τ (σ (x)) < vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)). It follows that 0< d(x).
Next, consider any x ∈ VMIN. In this case, Fσ ′,τ ′ (vσ ,τ )(x) = vσ ,τ (τ ′(x)) and Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ )(x) = vσ ,τ (τ (x)). Thus, by Eq. (5),
d(x) = vσ ,τ (τ ′(x)) − vσ ,τ (τ (x)). Since τ is optimal w.r.t. σ , by Lemma 2.16 we must have vσ ,τ (x) = min{vσ ,τ (y) | (x, y) ∈
E} vσ ,τ (τ ′(x)). Since vσ ,τ (x) = vσ ,τ (τ (x)), we get that vσ ,τ (τ (x)) vσ ,τ (τ ′(x)). It follows that 0 d(x).
Finally, consider any x ∈ (VMAX − S) ∪ VAVE. In this case, it is easy to see from Deﬁnition 2.13 that when restricted to
position x, the actions of Fσ ′,τ ′ and Fσ ,τ on any value vector v are the same. It follows from Eq. (5) that d(x) = 0.
Thus, we have shown that for every x ∈ VPOS, vσ ,τ (x)  vσ ′,τ ′ (x), and for every x ∈ S , vσ ,τ (x) < vσ ′,τ ′ (x). This proves
that vσ ,τ ≺ vσ ′,τ ′ . 
Lemma 3.6 says that switching the choice of a single MAX-position would either result in an improved value vector or
result in a value vector that is no better than the original, if MIN always plays optimally. Notice that in general switching
the choices of a subset of MAX-positions may result in an incomparable value vector. (See Fig. 2 for an example and refer
to the discussion made after the proof of Lemma 3.6 on this example.) However, this lemma states that if the choice of only
one such position is switched and if MIN always plays optimally, then the value vectors must be comparable.
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Lemma 3.6. Let G be any stopping SSG. Let σ and σ ′ beMAX-strategies in G such that σ ′ is obtained from σ by switching the choice
of a single MAX-position x, i.e., σ ′ = switch(σ , {x}). Then, vσ ,τ (σ ) and vσ ′,τ (σ ′) are not incomparable, i.e., either vσ ,τ (σ ) ≺ vσ ′,τ (σ ′)
or vσ ′,τ (σ ′)  vσ ,τ (σ ) . Moreover, we have vσ ,τ (σ ) ≺ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) if and only if x is vσ ,τ (σ )-switchable.
Proof. For brevity, we use τ to denote τ (σ ), an optimal MIN-strategy w.r.t. σ , and use τ ′ to denote τ (σ ′), an optimal
MIN-strategy w.r.t. σ ′ .
If x is a vσ ,τ -switchable MAX-position, then, by Lemma 3.5, it holds that vσ ,τ ≺ vσ ′,τ ′ since σ ′ = switch(σ , {x}). So, we
suppose next that x is a MAX-position such that vσ ,τ (x) = max{vσ ,τ (y) | (x, y) ∈ E}.
We can break down the construction of the pair of strategies σ ′ , τ ′ from σ , τ into two steps: (i) the construction of the
pair of strategies σ ′ , τ from σ , τ in the ﬁrst step, and (ii) the construction of the pair σ ′ , τ ′ from σ ′ , τ in the second step.
In the ﬁrst step σ ′ is obtained from σ as a result of switching the choice of a position x ∈ VMAX, i.e., σ ′ = switch(σ , {x}). In
the second step, τ ′ is an optimal strategy of MIN w.r.t. σ ′ . We will show that vσ ′,τ  vσ ,τ and vσ ′,τ ′  vσ ′,τ . By transitivity
of , it would immediately imply that vσ ′,τ ′  vσ ,τ .
The proof of vσ ′,τ  vσ ,τ is similar to that of Lemma 3.5. Since G is a stopping SSG, we know from Lemma 2.14 that
vσ ,τ and vσ ′,τ are the unique solutions to the following matrix equations:
vσ ,τ = Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ , (6)
vσ ′,τ = Qσ ′,τ vσ ′,τ + bσ ′,τ , (7)
for some |VPOS| × |VPOS| matrices Qσ ,τ and Qσ ′,τ , and |VPOS|-vectors bσ ,τ and bσ ′,τ . Let ϑ = vσ ,τ − vσ ′,τ . We show that
0 ϑ . By Deﬁnition 3.2, this would imply that vσ ′,τ  vσ ,τ .
Subtracting Eq. (7) from Eq. (6), we get
ϑ = (Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ ) − (Qσ ′,τ vσ ′,τ + bσ ′,τ ).
Adding and subtracting (Qσ ′,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ) to the r.h.s. of the above equation, we get
ϑ = (Qσ ′,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ) − (Qσ ′,τ vσ ′,τ + bσ ′,τ ) + (Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ ) − (Qσ ′,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ), or
ϑ = Qσ ′,τ ϑ + d,
where d = (Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ ) − (Qσ ′,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ ). From Lemma 2.14, we know that I − Qσ ′,τ is invertible since G is
a stopping SSG. Therefore, there is a unique solution to ϑ given by ϑ = (I − Qσ ′,τ )−1d. Lemma 2.14 also implies that
(I − Qσ ′,τ )−1 has all entries non-negative. So, it suﬃces to show that 0 d.
Notice that the vector Qσ ,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ,τ equals to Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ ) and the vector Qσ ′,τ vσ ,τ + bσ ′,τ equals to Fσ ′,τ (vσ ,τ ),
where the operators Fσ ,τ and Fσ ′,τ are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.13. Thus, it follows that
d = Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ ) − Fσ ′,τ (vσ ,τ ). (8)
Consider the MAX-position x such that σ ′ = switch(σ , {x}). In this case, Fσ ,τ (vσ ,τ )(x) = vσ ,τ (σ (x)) and Fσ ′,τ (vσ ,τ )(x) =
vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)). Thus, by Eq. (8), d(x) = vσ ,τ (σ (x)) − vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)). Next recall the assumption that vσ ,τ (x) = max{vσ ,τ (y) |
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vσ ,τ (σ ′(x)) vσ ,τ (σ (x)). It follows that 0 d(x).
Next, consider any position x′ 	= x. In this case, it is easy to see from Deﬁnition 2.13 that when restricted to position
x′ , the actions of Fσ ,τ and Fσ ′,τ on any value vector v are the same. It follows from Eq. (8) that d(x′) = 0. Thus, we have
shown that vσ ′,τ  vσ ,τ .
The other implication, vσ ′,τ ′  vσ ′,τ , follows from the fact that τ ′ is an optimal MIN-strategy w.r.t. σ ′ . Speciﬁcally, since
τ ′ is optimal w.r.t. σ ′ , we have, for every x ∈ VPOS, vσ ′,τ ′ = minτ vσ ′,τ (x) by Deﬁnition 2.6. It follows that, for any strategy
τ and for every x ∈ VPOS, we have vσ ′,τ ′ (x) vσ ′,τ (x). This gives vσ ′,τ ′  vσ ′,τ by Deﬁnition 3.2. 
Lemma 3.6 is no longer true if we require the strategies σ and σ ′ to differ in the choices of more than one MAX-
positions. Fig. 2 shows a stopping SSG in which switching the choices of two MAX-positions results in an incomparable
value vector when MIN always plays optimally. In this SSG, there are the following four possibilities of a MAX-strategy:
Case 1: σ = {(1, 2), (3, 2)}. In this case, it can be shown that an optimal MIN-strategy τ (σ ) is {(2,4)} and vσ ,τ (σ ) =
(1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2). Thus, we have Sσ = Tτ (σ ) = ∅. Let this strategy pair σ , τ (σ ) be denoted by σ1, τ1.
Case 2: σ = {(1, 7), (3, 2)}. In this case, it can be shown that τ (σ ) must be {(2,5)} and vσ ,τ (σ ) = (1/4,1/3,1/3,5/12,1/3).
Thus, we have Sσ = {1} and Tτ (σ ) = ∅. Let this strategy pair σ , τ (σ ) be denoted by σ2, τ2.
Case 3: σ = {(1, 2), (3, 7)}. In this case, it can be shown that an optimal MIN-strategy τ (σ ) is {(2,4)} and vσ ,τ (σ ) =
(3/8,3/8,1/4,3/8,3/8). Thus, we have Sσ = {3} and Tτ (σ ) = ∅. Let this strategy pair σ , τ (σ ) be denoted by σ3, τ3.
Case 4: σ = {(1, 7), (3, 7)}. In this case, it can be shown that τ (σ ) must be {(2,5)} and vσ ,τ (σ ) = (1/4,5/16,1/4,3/8,5/16).
Thus, we have Sσ = {1,3} and Tτ (σ ) = ∅. Let this strategy pair σ , τ (σ ) be denoted by σ4, τ4.
Out of the
(4
2
)= 6 pairs of MAX-strategies (σi, σ j), where 1 i < j  4, the following four pairs of MAX-strategies differ
only in the choice of a single MAX-position: (σ1, σ2), (σ1, σ3), (σ2, σ4), and (σ3, σ4). For these pairs of MAX-strategies,
the corresponding expected payoff vectors satisfy the following relationships: vσ2,τ2 ≺ vσ1,τ1 , vσ3,τ3 ≺ vσ1,τ1 , vσ4,τ4 ≺ vσ2,τ2 ,
and vσ4,τ4 ≺ vσ3,τ3 . The other two pairs of MAX-strategies, namely (σ1, σ4) and (σ2, σ3), differ in the choices of two MAX-
positions as σ4 = switch(σ1, {1,3}) and σ3 = switch(σ2, {1,3}). Although, for the pair (σ1, σ4), the corresponding expected
payoff vector satisﬁes vσ4,τ4 ≺ vσ1,τ1 , the other pair (σ2, σ3) has no such relationship. In fact, vσ2,τ2 and vσ3,τ3 are incom-
parable as vσ2,τ2 (1) < vσ3,τ3(1) and vσ2,τ2 (3) > vσ3,τ3 (3).
Lemma 3.7 says that if a MAX-strategy σ ′ is such that all vσ ,τ (σ )-switchable MAX-positions of another MAX-strategy σ
are also vσ ′,τ (σ ′)-switchable, then vσ ′,τ (σ ′) cannot be better than vσ ,τ (σ ) .
Lemma 3.7. Let G be any stopping SSG. If σ and σ ′ are two MAX-strategies in G such that they both agree on positions in Sσ (i.e.,
∀x ∈ Sσ , σ(x) = σ ′(x)), then vσ ′,τ (σ ′)  vσ ,τ (σ ) .
Proof. Consider a new game H obtained from G as follows: The vertex set V (H) of H is the same as the vertex set V (G)
of G and the edge set E(H) of H is given by
E(H) = {(x, y) ∈ E(G) ∣∣ x /∈ Sσ }⊎
(⊎
x∈Sσ
{(
x,σ (x)
)
,
(
x,σ (x)
)})
.
Here, ‘
⊎
’ is the union operation on multisets. Thus, E(H) contains all edges (x, y) ∈ E(G) such that x /∈ Sσ . On the other
hand, for each x ∈ Sσ , E(H) contains two copies of (x, σ (x)), but does not contain any edge (x, z) such that z 	= σ(x).
Notice that every MAX- (MIN-) strategy in H is also a MAX- (respectively, MIN-) strategy in G . From this observation,
it follows that (similar to G) H is a stopping SSG. Since σ and σ ′ agree on vertices in Sσ , both σ ,τ (σ ) and σ ′, τ (σ ′)
are strategies in H by the deﬁnition of E(H). Let vσ ,τ (σ )[G] and vσ ,τ (σ )[H] be the value vectors corresponding to the
strategies σ , τ (σ ) in G and H , respectively. In a similar way, we deﬁne vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[G] and vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[H] as the value vectors
corresponding to the strategies σ ′ , τ (σ ′) in G and H , respectively. It is easy to see that
vσ ,τ (σ )[G] = vσ ,τ (σ )[H] and vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[G] = vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[H]. (9)
Claim 1. σ , τ (σ ) are optimal strategies of H.
Proof of Claim 2. By the deﬁnition of Sσ , we know that every position x /∈ Sσ is vσ ,τ (σ )[G]-stable. The equality of vσ ,τ (σ )[G]
and vσ ,τ (σ )[H] in (9) implies that every x /∈ Sσ is also vσ ,τ (σ )[H]-stable. For every x ∈ Sσ , the edge (x, σ (x)) is duplicated
in H . It follows that every position x ∈ Sσ is also vσ ,τ (σ )[H]-stable. This shows that every position of H is vσ ,τ (σ )[H]-stable.
By Deﬁnition 2.11, we get that σ and τ (σ ) are vσ ,τ (σ )[H]-greedy strategies for MAX and MIN, respectively. Since H is a
stopping SSG, it follows from Lemma 2.20 (1) and (4) that σ , τ (σ ) are optimal strategies of H . 
Claim 2. τ (σ ′) is an optimal MIN-strategy w.r.t. σ ′ in H.
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vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[G](x) = min
{
vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[G](y)
∣∣ (x, y) ∈ E(G)}.
The equality of vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[G] and vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[H] in (9) and the deﬁnition of E(H) imply that, for every x ∈ VMIN,
vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[H](x) = min
{
vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[H](y)
∣∣ (x, y) ∈ E(H)}.
Thus, it follows from Lemma 2.16(2) that τ (σ ′) is optimal w.r.t. σ ′ in H . 
As a consequence of Claim 1, Claim 2, and Lemma 3.4, we get that vσ ′,τ (σ ′)[H]  vσ ,τ (σ )[H]. The equality in (9) now
implies that vσ ′,τ (σ ′)  vσ ,τ (σ ) . 
3.2. An improved analysis of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm
In this section, we prove that the number of iterations in the worst case required by the Hoffman–Karp strategy im-
provement algorithm is O (2n/n). This improves upon the previously known, trivial, worst-case upper bound 2n for this
algorithm.
Lemma 3.8 shows that in the Hoffman–Karp algorithm the value vectors monotonically increase with the number of
iterations.
Lemma 3.8. Let σi, τ (σi) and σ j, τ (σ j) be pairs of player strategies at the start of iterations i and j, respectively, for 1 i < j, of the
Hoffman–Karp algorithm. Then, it holds that vσi ,τ (σi) ≺ vσ j ,τ (σ j) .
Proof. The proof is by induction on j− i. Note that at the start of the (i+1)’th iteration of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm, we
have σi+1 =df switch(σi, Sσi ). So, Lemma 3.5 implies that vσi ,τ (σi) ≺ vσi+1,τ (σi+1) . This completes the proof when j = i + 1.
If i + 1< j, then by induction hypothesis we get that vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ≺ vσ j ,τ (σ j) . Using this relation and vσi ,τ (σi) ≺ vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ,
it follows by the transitivity of ≺ that vσi ,τ (σi) ≺ vσ j ,τ (σ j) . 
An easy consequence of Lemma 3.8 is Corollary 3.9. This corollary shows that if a MAX-strategy σ ′ does not yield an
improved value vector vσ ′,τ (σ ′) compared to the value vector vσi+1,τ (σi+1) at the start of iteration i + 1, then σ ′ cannot
appear after iteration i + 1.
Corollary 3.9. For every integer 1  i, let σi, τ (σi) denote a pair of player strategies at the start of iteration i of the Hoffman–Karp
algorithm. Let σ ′ be any MAX-strategy. If vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ⊀ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) , then for any i + 2 j, we have σ ′ 	= σ j .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that, for some i + 2  j, we have σ ′ = σ j . Then Lemma 3.8 implies that vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ≺
vσ ′,τ (σ ′) , a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.10 shows that the set of all switchable MAX-positions differ from one iteration to another in the Hoffman–Karp
strategy improvement algorithm.
Lemma 3.10. Let σi, τ (σi) and σ j, τ (σ j) be pairs of player strategies at the start of iterations i and j, respectively, for 1 i < j, of the
Hoffman–Karp algorithm. Then, it holds that Sσi  Sσ j .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that for some 1  i < j, we have Sσi ⊆ Sσ j . Let S be the (possibly empty) subset of Sσi
containing all positions x on which σi and σ j disagree. (That is, S =df {x ∈ Sσi | σi(x) 	= σ j(x)}.) We deﬁne a new strategy
σ ′ of MAX as follows: σ ′ =df switch(σ j, S). Then, σi and σ ′ agree on positions in Sσi . Application of Lemma 3.7 gives
vσ ′,τ (σ ′)  vσi ,τ (σi) . On the other hand, vσ j ,τ (σ j)  vσ ′,τ (σ ′) by Lemma 3.5, since σ ′ = switch(σ j, S) and S ⊆ Sσi ⊆ Sσ j . By
transitivity of , we get that vσ j ,τ (σ j)  vσi ,τ (σi) . However, this gives a contradiction with Lemma 3.8. 
Lemma 3.11 allows to show that the Hoffman–Karp algorithm rules out, at the end of every iteration, a number of MAX-
strategies that is at least linear in the number of switchable MAX-positions. To see this, notice that by this lemma, in every
iteration, there are at least |Sσ |−1 strategy pairs σi , τ (σi) such that vσ ,τ (σ ) ≺ vσi ,τ (σi)  vσ ′,τ (σ ′) . Thus, Lemma 3.8 implies
that none of these strategies can appear in any earlier iteration and Corollary 3.9 implies that none of them can appear in
any later iteration.
Lemma 3.11. Let σ , τ (σ ) and σ ′ =df switch(σ , Sσ ), τ ′ =df τ (σ ′) be pairs of player strategies at the start and at the end, respectively,
of an iteration of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm. Then, there are at least |Sσ | − 1 strategy pairs σi , τ (σi) such that vσ ,τ ≺ vσi ,τ (σi) 
vσ ′,τ ′ .
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For notational convenience, let τ (S) denote τ (σ (S)), which is an optimal MIN-strategy w.r.t. σ(S).
Assume w.l.o.g. that vσ({1}),τ ({1}) is a minimal value vector among the set of value vectors vσ({i}),τ ({i}) for 1 i  |Sσ |. In
other words, we assume that for every 2 i  |Sσ |, we have either vσ({1}),τ ({1})  vσ({i}),τ ({i}) or vσ({i}),τ ({i}) is incomparable
to vσ({1}),τ ({1}) . By Lemma 3.5, we know that vσ ,τ ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) .
Claim 3. For every 2 i  |Sσ |, it holds that vσ({1}),τ ({1})  vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) .
For now assume that Claim 3 is true. (We prove this claim at the end of the proof of Lemma 3.11.) Pick a minimal value
vector, say vσ({1,2}),τ ({1,2}) , among the set of value vectors vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) for 2 i  |Sσ |. This gives the sequence
vσ ,τ ≺ vσ ({1}),τ ({1})  vσ ({1,2}),τ ({1,2}).
Repeating the arguments of Claim 3 with vσ({1,2}),τ ({1,2}) in place of vσ({1}),τ ({1}) gives the following statement: For every
3 i  |Sσ |, it holds that vσ({1,2}),τ ({1,2})  vσ({1,2,i}),τ ({1,2,i}) . Next, we pick a minimal value vector, say vσ({1,2,3}),τ ({1,2,3}) ,
among the set of value vectors vσ({1,2,i}),τ ({1,2,i}) for 3 i  |Sσ |. This gives the sequence
vσ ,τ ≺ vσ ({1}),τ ({1})  vσ ({1,2}),τ ({1,2})  vσ ({1,2,3}),τ ({1,2,3}).
By proceeding in the above manner, the monotonically increasing sequence
vσ ,τ ≺ vσ ({1}),τ ({1})  vσ ({1,2}),τ ({1,2})  vσ ({1,2,3}),τ ({1,2,3})  · · · vσ (Sσ ),τ (Sσ ) = vσ ′,τ ′
is obtained. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
We now give a proof of Claim 3.
Proof of Claim 3. Assume to the contrary that, for some 2 i  |Sσ |, we have vσ({1}),τ ({1})  vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) . Then, it must
be the case that either vσ({1}),τ ({1}) and vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) are incomparable or vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) . Since σ({1, i}) =
switch(σ ({1}), {i}), Lemma 3.6 implies that vσ({1}),τ ({1}) and vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) are not incomparable. Therefore, we must have
vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) .
We next show that vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({i}),τ ({i}) . Notice that σ({1, i}) = switch(σ ({i}), {1}). By Lemma 3.6, we must have
either vσ({i}),τ ({i})  vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) or vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({i}),τ ({i}) . If the former holds, then by the transitivity of , we get
that vσ({i}),τ ({i})  vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) . However, the relation vσ({i}),τ ({i}) ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) contradicts the minimality
of vσ({1}),τ ({1}) . Therefore, we must have vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({i}),τ ({i}) .
Thus, we have shown that vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) and vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({i}),τ ({i}) . We claim that both 1, i ∈
Sσ({1,i}) . To see this, note that σ({1}) = switch(σ ({1, i}), {i}) and vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ({1}),τ ({1}) . So, by Lemma 3.6, we must
have i ∈ Sσ({1,i}) . In the same way, we must have 1 ∈ Sσ({1,i}) .
We now know that σ = switch(σ ({1, i}), {1, i}), where {1, i} ⊆ Sσ({1,i}) . Lemma 3.5 implies that we must have
vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) ≺ vσ ,τ . However, we also have {1, i} ⊆ Sσ and σ({1, i}) = switch(σ , {1, i}). So, Lemma 3.5 also implies that
vσ ,τ ≺ vσ({1,i}),τ ({1,i}) . This gives a contradiction. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of Section 3.2.
Theorem 3.12. The Hoffman–Karp algorithm requires at most O (2n/n) iterations in the worst case, where n = min{|VMAX|, |VMIN|}.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that n = |VMAX|  |VMIN|. We partition the analysis of the number of iterations into two cases:
(1) iterations in which |Sσ | n/3 and (2) iterations in which |Sσ | > n/3.
By Lemma 3.10, the set of all switchable MAX-positions cannot repeat throughout the iterations of the Hoffman–Karp
algorithm. Therefore, the number of iterations in which |Sσ | n/3 is bounded by ∑n/3k=0 (nk), which is at most 2n·H(1/3) by
Fact 3.3. In case (2), since |Sσ | > n/3 in each such iteration, by Lemma 3.11 the Hoffman–Karp algorithm rules out at least
n/3 strategies σi such that vσ ,τ ≺ vσi ,τ (σi)  vσ ′,τ ′ . (Note that σ ,τ refers to the strategy pair at the start of the current
iteration and σ ′ , τ ′ refers to the strategy pair at the start of the next iteration.) Therefore, the number of iterations in which
|Sσ | > n/3 is bounded by 2n/(n/3) = 3 · 2n/n.
It follows that the Hoffman–Karp algorithm requires at most 2n·H(1/3) +3 ·2n/n 4 ·2n/n iterations in the worst case. 
3.3. A randomized variant of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm
We propose a randomized strategy improvement algorithm (Algorithm 2) for the SSG value problem. This algorithm
can be seen as a variation of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm in that, instead of deterministically choosing all switchable
MAX-positions, the randomized algorithm chooses a uniformly random subset of the switchable MAX-positions in each
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Output: Optimal strategies σ ,τ and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Let σ be an arbitrary MAX-strategy and τ = τ (σ ) be a MIN-strategy2
while (FG (vσ ,τ ) 	= vσ ,τ ) do3
S ← a uniformly random subset of vσ ,τ -switchable MAX-positions4
Let σ ′ ← switch(σ , S)5
Let τ ′ be an optimal strategy of MIN w.r.t. σ ′6
Let σ ← σ ′ , τ ← τ ′7
end8
Output σ ,τ and the optimal value vector vσ ,τ9
end10
Algorithm 2: A randomized variant of the Hoffman–Karp algorithm.
iteration. Similar to the results in Section 3.2, our results in this section extend those of Mansour and Singh [15] for policy
iteration algorithms for Markov decision processes. We mention that Condon [3] also presented a randomized variant of the
Hoffman–Karp algorithm that is different from ours. The expected number of iterations of Condon’s algorithm is at most
2n− f (n) + 2o(n) , for any function f (n) = o(n), where n = min{|VMAX|, |VMIN|}.
It can be veriﬁed that analogs of Lemma 3.8, Corollary 3.9, and Lemma 3.10 hold for Algorithm 2. Therefore, we state
the following results without giving their proofs.
Lemma 3.13. Let σi, τ (σi) and σ j, τ (σ j) be pairs of player strategies at the start of iterations i and j, respectively, for 1  i < j, of
Algorithm 2. Then, it holds that vσi ,τ (σi) ≺ vσ j ,τ (σ j) .
Corollary 3.14. For every integer 1 i, let σi, τ (σi) denote a pair of player strategies at the start of iteration i of Algorithm 2. Let σ ′
be any MAX-strategy. If vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ⊀ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) , then for any i + 2 j, we have σ ′ 	= σ j .
Lemma 3.15. Let σi, τ (σi) and σ j, τ (σ j) be pairs of player strategies at the start of iterations i and j, respectively, for 1  i < j, of
Algorithm 2. Then, it holds that Sσi  Sσ j .
Lemma 3.16 allows to show that Algorithm 2 rules out, at the end of every iteration, a number of MAX strategies that
on expectation is at least exponential in the number of switchable MAX-positions. To see this, notice that by this lemma,
in every iteration, the expected number of MAX-strategies σ ′ such that vσi ,τ (σi)  vσ ′,τ (σ ′) and vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ⊀ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) is at
least 2|Sσi |−1. Thus, Lemma 3.13 implies that none of these strategies can appear in any earlier iteration and Corollary 3.14
implies that none of them can appear in any later iteration.
Lemma 3.16. In Algorithm 2, let σi , τ (σi) be a pair of player strategies at the start of an iteration in which Sσi is nonempty, and let
σi+1 , τ (σi+1) be a pair of player strategies at the end of this iteration. Then, the expected number of MAX-strategies σ ′ such that
vσi ,τ (σi)  vσ ′,τ (σ ′) and vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ⊀ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) is at least 2|Sσi |−1 .
Proof. Consider an iteration in which σi , τ (σi) is a pair of player strategies such that Sσi is nonempty. Let U denote the set
of all MAX-strategies obtained from σi by switching some subset of Sσi , i.e., U = {σ | (∃S ⊆ Sσi )[σ = switch(σi, S)]}. Clearly,
|U | = 2|Sσi | . For each strategy σ ∈ U , we associate sets U+σ and U−σ that are deﬁned as follows:
U+σ =df
{
σ ′ ∈ U ∣∣ vσ ,τ (σ ) ≺ vσ ′,τ (σ ′)} and U−σ =df {σ ′ ∈ U ∣∣ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) ≺ vσ ,τ (σ )}.
Notice that, for any pair σ , σ ′ ∈ U , we have σ ′ ∈ U+σ if and only if σ ∈ U−σ ′ . From this equivalence, it follows that
∑
σ∈U
∣∣U+σ ∣∣=
∑
σ∈U
∣∣U−σ ∣∣ |U |
2
2
.
Thus, for a strategy σi+1 chosen uniformly at random from U in the current iteration, the expected number of MAX-
strategies σ ′ ∈ U such that vσi+1,τ (σi+1) ⊀ vσ ′,τ (σ ′) is
= |U | − 1|U | ·
∑
σ∈U
∣∣U+σ ∣∣
 |U |
2
= 2|Sσi |−1.
Moreover, by Lemma 3.5, every such MAX-strategy σ ′ satisﬁes vσi ,τ (σi)  vσ ′,τ (σ ′) . 
We are now ready to prove the main result of Section 3.3.
278 R. Tripathi et al. / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 9 (2011) 263–278Theorem 3.17. With probability at least 1 − 2−2Ω(n) , Algorithm 2 requires at most O (20.78n) iterations in the worst case, where
n = min{|VMAX|, |VMIN|}.
Proof. Let c ∈ (0,1/2) that we will ﬁx later in the proof. W.l.o.g. assume that n = |VMAX| |VMIN|. We partition the analysis
of the number of iterations i into two cases: (1) iterations in which |Sσi | cn and (2) iterations in which |Sσi | > cn.
By Lemma 3.15, the set of all switchable MAX-positions cannot repeat throughout the iterations of Algorithm 2. There-
fore, as in the proof of Theorem 3.12, the number of iterations i in which σi , τ (σi) is a pair of player strategies at the start
of it and |Sσi | cn is bounded by
∑cn
k=0
(n
k
)
, which is at most 2n·H(c) by Fact 3.3.
We next bound the number t∗ of iterations i in which σi, τ (σi) is a pair of player strategies at the start of it and
|Sσi | > cn. By Lemma 3.16, the expected number of MAX-strategies σ ′ that Algorithm 2 rules out in each such iteration is
at least 2|Sσi |−1  2cn . It follows from Markov’s inequality that, with probability at least 1/2, Algorithm 2 rules out at least
2cn−1 MAX-strategies in each such iteration.
We say that an iteration i in which |Sσi | > cn is good if Algorithm 2 rules out at least 2cn−1 MAX-strategies at the end
of it. We know from above that the probability that an iteration i in which |Sσi | > cn is good is at least 1/2. By Chernoff
bounds, for any t > 0, at least 1/4 of the t iterations i in which |Sσi | > cn will be good with probability at least 1− e−t/16.
Thus, with probability at least 1 − e−t∗/16, there are at least t∗/4 iterations such that Algorithm 2 rules out at least 2cn−1
MAX-strategies at the end of each one of them; so, this gives 2cn−1 · t∗/4 < 2n or t∗ < 2n(1−c)+3. In other words, with
probability at least 1− e−t∗/16, the number t∗ of iterations i in which |Sσi | > cn is at most 2n(1−c)+3.
Thus, the total number of iterations is at most 2n·H(c) + 2n·(1−c)+3 with probability at least 1 − e−t∗/16. Choosing c ∈
(0,1/2) such that H(c) = 1− c gives c ≈ 0.227. For c = 0.227, this number of iterations is O (20.78n). Also, when the number
of iterations (and so t∗) is O (20.78n), then the probability of success is at least 1− 2−2Ω(n) . 
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